The Cornwall Chronicle, Sat 6 Jan 1838 1
GEORGE TOWN.
We have for some time been sick of complaints from George Town, and had determined on forgetting that such a township was on the banks of the Tamar. The receipt of a letter, however, during the past week from a new correspondent, who is well known to us as a respectable man, and one who would not complain without reason, urges us once more to call the attention of the Authorities to the situation of its inhabitants. To avoid the necessity offering remarks on the subject treated on by our correspondent, we shall give a portion of his communication and for the present leave the matter:—
Nor is this the only outrage that has been committed here lately, each day brings with it some fresh specimen of insubordination on the part of the very few prisoners stationed in the town, which already threatens the interests of the free population with destruction, and if permitted to continue, must drive every respectable inhabitant from the township. One other fact I will name. About six or seven weeks back, one of the Port Officer’s signal men was charged before the Port Officer, he being the resident magistrate [Lieutenant Matthew Curling Friend], with the commission of an unnatural crime. The evidence adduced against this fellow was so satisfactory to the magistrate, that he sentenced him to a chain-gang for a certain period. This wretch has not, since his trial and conviction, been subjected to the slightest restraint— he has not been put into confinement —but has been at large, an idle man, walking about the streets at his pleasure since, until a few days ago, when he was reinstated in his original birth as signal man, in which capacity he is now acting, at the house of the resident magistrate and Port Officer.
But, Sir, this is not all the privilege granted to the fellow alluded to. In company with several of his felon associates, he was permitted to serenade the inhabitants of the township, during several nights of the Christmas season, with a fiddle, and other instrumental music. Astonished as many, and I may say, all the respectable townspeople were at such a privilege being given to men in the chain-gang, and particular to this wretch under sentence to a chain-gang for the worst crime human nature can perpetrate no one dare say one word under the present system.
We abstain from commenting upon the above singular statement. Our informant does not write to us anonymously; he gives us permission to use his name, and pledges himself ready to prove all he has written, which is very much more than we think proper to publish.
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The Launceston Advertiser, Thu 12 Apr 1838 2
Monday, April 9.
Regina v. Goodwin.—Ex-officio. The Attorney General for the prosecution, Mr Stephen for defence.
The Attorney General opened the case, which he stated was for a libel published in the Cornwall Chronicle of 6th January last [1838]. In this case he had the honor of conducting the prosecution on the part of the Queen. The information in the usual manner charged Mr William Lushington Goodwin 3 , the printer and publisher of the Chronicle, with having maliciously printed and published an article reflecting upon the character of Lieut. [Matthew Curling] Friend 4 , as Justice of the Peace, Resident Magistrate at George Town, and Port Officer, and charging him with corruption in the said offices. The defendant had pleaded Not Guilty. The libel complained of was as follows:—[see 6 January 1838 Cornwall Chronicle article above]
The Attorney-General continued—The facts of this case lie in a narrow compass. The jury will have to examine calmly and dispassionately if the impressions produced on the public mind by the publicationcomplained of, are not such as the information charges; and whether therefore it is not a libel as so charged,and within the meaning of the information.
The printing and publication was admitted by the defendant’s counsel; and the following witnesses were called:—
M[atthew] C[urling] Friend.—I am resident magistrate at George Town and Port Officer of the Port of Launceston; I am one of the justices of the peace of this island; I have read the article headed “George Town” in the Cornwall Chronicle now produced; I have read it before to-day; I think the article intended to convey imputations on my character; I think it would point out that I was ignorant of my duty as a magistrate, in trying a man on a charge I was not competent to try him for; I could only have committed him for trial on such a charge; and secondly, that, at least, I must be a man indifferent to a crime at which every one else shudders.
Cross-examined.—There was a man employed as a signalman prior to the publication of this article, named John Dubbins; he was a transported offender; he was charged before me with an offence before the publication of that article; the charge was made on the 13th of December [1837]; it was, that Dubbins had harboured a boy in his hut, who was out of the Penitentiary after hours; the record-book of the Police Office which I now produce contains the evidence on which the sentence under that charge was awarded; the sentence of Dubbins was two months to a road-gang and hard labor; the boy was sentenced to seven days in the cells the charge was not for an unnatural offence; had it been so I could not have finally decided upon the case, it must have gone to a jury; the charge and evidence as contained in the record produced were public proceedings at the Police Office at George Town; Dubbins was sent to a road party immediately after his sentence; he was sent to the George Town road party, where I always send men under sentence to the roads until the Governor has appointed a particular party in which they are to be employed; after he had been sent to the George Town road party, and before his Excellency had named the party in which he was to undergo his sentence, I was obliged to re-call him to the signal station to teach another man the signals; he was not reinstated in office—on the contrary; he was not permitted to sleep even in his hut, as formerly, he attended to the duty by day, and was locked in the cells at night; his sentence was never remitted; he was in George Town during the Christmas season; I have been told that he went round the town with the singers on the Christmas eve; it never occurred but that one night; I do not speak in answer to the two last questions of my own knowledge; I have made enquiries, and I believe the singing only occurred the one night; the road-gang at George Town is not a chain-gang; it would not in fact be termed a road-gang officially; it is a gang of disposable men who are thus made use of for public benefit; the signal station is about 100 feet from my house; I do not remember any information being made officially by Mr Tregurtha of the insubordination of the prisoners during the Christmas season; nor, officially, upon the subject of this man serenading upon the Christmas eve; there certainly was not any insubordination to my knowledge about that time, amongst the prisoners at George Town.
Re-examined.—Dubbins was sent immediately from the Police Office to the George Town road party, remained there a short time, and was then brought back to the signal station, where he remained about a fortnight or three weeks, instructing a man I intended for the station; I then received information of the gang to which the Governor had directed the prisoner should be sent, and I sent him off on the first eligible opportunity; I believe this to have been the case, from its being my usual practice in similar cases; it is generally a fortnight after the sentence has been transmitted to the Governor, before I receive instructions as to the destiny of sentenced men; it may then be a week or two before I can remove them, waiting an escort; during this time I employ them as before stated in the road gang at George Town.
Henry Reed, Esq.—I have looked at the Cornwall Chronicle produced; I have read the article headed “George Town;” I believe the article is intended to convey an imputation against Capt Friend; to my mind it would convey that Mr Friend considered, by the evidence in the case referred to, that the man was guilty of the crime, but, from some improper motives, instead of taking the steps which the law directed, he merely sentenced the offender to a road-gang; and that even this sentence was after remitted.
Cross-examined.—I do not find any comment upon the leniency of the sentence in the publication, it is therein stated that the magistrate was satisfied with the evidence produced—notwithstanding he only sentenced the man to a road party; if so convinced he could not have known his duty to have thus acted; or, knowing it, he must have been actuated by improper motives in acting as is charged in this article.
HE Lawrence, Esq.—I have read the article referred to; I have seen it before; I should say, in general terms, that the article is calculated to throw odium and reproach on the character of Capt Friend, as a magistrate, and as a gentleman. The imputation appears to me complex; first, he is charged with trying an offence to which his powers as a magistrate did not extend; secondly, with relieving the offender from the effects of that sentence,—the crime being one in which the exercise of lenity is peculiarly offensive in the world.
Major Ryan, 50th regt —I have read the article referred to; the article conveys to my mind an imputation injurious to the character of Capt Friend; it seems to attribute to him a connivance with the man so charged,—most discreditable to his character as a gentleman and a magistrate; the words “at the house” in this paragraph are not in the same print as the rest of the article—they are in italics. This closed the case for the prosecution.
MR STEPHEN for the defence, commenced by expressing regret that the mode of prosecution resorted to, had been an ex-officio information;—since he presumed, that the article complained of being one reflecting on individual character, the setting right of that character was the point aimed at —an end, which was not nevertheless fully to be attained by a criminal prosecution, the object of which was, chiefly, punishment. He begged the jury to bear in mind the peculiar position of a newspaper editor, liable occasionally to fall into inaccuracy of statement, even with the best intentions; to consider his duties, for every editor had duties to discharge, though he assumed them voluntarily; and to make proper allowance for unintentional errors in their performance, for the sake of the great public interests which the press was confessedly so well calculated to promote.
He lamented that it had not been thought a better course in this instance, to try the nature of Mr Friend’s injuries, and the extent of Mr Goodwin’s delinquency, in a civil action; where the truth of the supposed charges would be directly in issue, and the excuse which the defendant meant to offer, that he originally had reason to believe them, would better, and more satisfactorily to the public, be decided. He stood not there to defend or extenuate any private libel. Mr Goodwin had not assaulted private character; had not referred to any private matters; had not intruded into the friendly circle, or invaded the domestic hearth. He was guilty,—if of any thing, —of calling public attention, and the attention of Government, to what he rightly deemed a matter of very great public importance; to the negligence, or the indiscretion, the remissances, or the erroneous judgment, of a public officer,—in relation to a public question; in which the Government and the public were deeply interested, and on which the conduct of Mr Friend was fairly, and indeed necessarily open to public remark and scrutiny.
Mr Goodwin, the editor of a public journal, receives information from more than one credible and respectable source, that a man employed in the Port Officer’s department, had been charged with a scandalous offence; and sentenced for it, by that officer as resident magistrate, to a chain gang. It now turns out, that the charge and sentence were not for that offence, but for harbouring; and the sentence was, not to a chain gain, but to a road party. Grievous errors! But, they are not errors affecting the charge, as complained of in this prosecution. Even if they were so, however, he (Mr Stephen) would contend, that in effect the charge really was, and he would prove that at George Town it was universally understood to be what Mr Goodwin’s informant told him it was. Let the jury consider the facts, as proved in evidence against the man; and they would see that such an understanding was not altogether without foundation. But, be this decided as it may, the material point in debate is the same.
The article was not complained of, as imputing to Mr Friend any impropriety, or error, in the entertaining of that charge, or the passing of that sentence; but, as imputing to Mr Friend impropriety, or error in not causing that sentence to be immediately carried into effect. And, on this point, (the only material one for present consideration) it is already in proof that Mr Goodwin’s information was substantially correct. The man was not removed to a road party; he was not subjected to that restraint which might have been expected to follow such a sentence, he walked the streets openly by day; he resorted as usual to his old berth, the signal station; and, nearly a fortnight after his conviction, he was allowed to perambulate the township serenading its inhabitants at midnight. These things were communicated to Mr Goodwin; he received them from more than one quarter; he was informed, that they were matters of notoriety, and topics of general complaint; and he published them accordingly. He (Mr Stephen) would contend, that such topics were peculiarly proper for public notice; and such as the press, if its usefulness were not wholly disclaimed, and its liberty treated as but a mere name, was entitled to deem within its cognizance. He did not know what there was in the liberty of the press, if it included not the right of publishing, on a fitting occasion, circumstances proper for public comment. And where shall we find an instance of such an occasion, or of circumstances of such a character, if they exist not here? Public and general rumour; public and common discontent; public and notorious observation; directed to the mistaken lenity, or injudicious delay, of a convicting magistrate, in carrying into effect the punishment justly awarded to crime; -- this is the occasion, which has produced, and which justifies, the present publication. He would maintain that, if the law forbad such a publication, under such circumstances as these, and if that law were to be rigorously enforced as here, by an ex-officio information, newspapers had better at once cease; their editors could not exist in safety a week; the press would be destroyed. He would however for the purpose of the present defence, be content even to pass by these all important topics. He begged the jury to bear in mind, what the present charge was. It was not, that Mr Goodwin imputed to Mr Friend remissness, neglect, supineness, want of knowledge, defect of judgement, culpable error. That the article in question imputed these, or some of these,—that it charged Mr Friend with impropriety of some kind,—he did not think it worth while to dispute. But the information alleged that the defendant imputed to Mr Friend for grosser impropriety; a degree, and a species of impropriety, or imputing, which to Mr Friend, he, (Mr Stephen) had his client’s solemn assurance that he never entertained the idea, for one moment.
The information states, that Mr Goodwin’s article imputed to Mr Friend, that, in the discharge of his offices, he had been guilty of corruption. The article, Mr Stephen submitted with confidence, imputed nothing of the sort. He contended that no portion of the article, justified such a construction. What insinuation was there, in any part of the article, that Mr Friend had done,—or rather omitted to do,—that which it was insisted it was his duty to have done, from the base motive of personal gain, or benefit to himself of any kind?—or, of any private and selfish consideration, having been the moving cause? But unless such an insinuation were really conveyed in the article, how could it be fairly said to impute to Mr Friend corruption? What is it not possible for a magistrate to misunderstand or neglect his duty—aye, and grossly too,—without being guilty of corruption? He begged them, on this point, on which his client had already solemnly disclaimed any such intention, to judge of the article for themselves; to discriminate carefully between the meaning, by considering well the import and value of words; and not, by returning a verdict of guilty which,—setting aside all other considerations favoring [sic] an acquittal, —would force unnaturally on Mr Goodwin’s language, or that of the correspondent, a meaning which he found venture to say, never entered the imagination of either. The learned gentleman then called.
Edward Primrose Tregurtha.—I have read the paragraph referred to in the Cornwall Chronicle of January 6; I recollect reading that journal a few days after its publication; before its publication I knew a man of the name of John Dubbings, or “Gentleman John;” previous to the publication I had a conversation with the defendant, Mr Goodwin at his office, relative to this man; at the time of that conversation general rumours had existed in George Town relative to Dubbings; rumours which created a very strong feeling in the place at that time; the rumours so far as relates to the offence charged against Dubbins, were that he had been brought up to the Police Office, for an unnatural crime; it was a general report; I do not recollect any general rumour as to what he was really sentenced to a road party for; as near as I remember, I told Mr Goodwin, in the conversation alluded to, that George Town was all in an uproar in consequence of this man, Dubbins, after the general rumours that he had committed such a crime, being permitted to be at large, and singing, with others, about the streets, at midnight; I further stated to Mr Goodwin that a few days after this occurred I asked the chief-constable by whose permission he was allowed to be at large, and he said by Capt Friend’s permission; I further told Mr Goodwin that I had myself seen the man about the town, after his conviction, quite at large. I believe I asked Capt Friend, a short time afterward if it was by his permission that Dubbins was serenading the town on Christmas, waking people at midnight; he did not answer me, but said, in a sneering kind of way, “I think we ought to feel much obliged to them for being awoke at such an hour, with such delightful music;” I told Mr Goodwin that I had seen him at large and idling about the town with a book, after being sentenced; I found Dubbins absent when I returned to George Town from Launceston.
Cross-examined.—It was about two days before the publication that I conversed with Mr Goodwin on thesubject referred to; I returned to George Town on the 7th; the paragraph was published on the 6th; I did not seeDubbins on my return home; I have not seen him since; I do not know that he had been sent away then.
The Attorney-General in reply spoke to the following effect.—It seems then,—may it please your Honor [Chief Justice Pedder] and Gentlemen of the Jury,—that this evidence of Mr Tregurtha, about the most extraordinary I ever heard offered in a court of justice, is intended to have the effect of inducing you to believe that the insertion of this libellous article in the Cornwall Chronicle proceeded from the most laudable motives on the part of the defendant; or, if that gentleman’s testimony falls in that respect, then it is addressed to the consideration of the Court in mitigation of the defendant’s punishment. Viewing it, gentlemen, in either of those tendencies, I must say it does appear to me “passing strange,” that so discriminating a mind as that of my learned friend should, even in the extremities of this case, have caught at an argument so utterly destitute of value in the sense in which he has urged it on your consideration; and not only valueless, but most mischievous, in the sense in which he has submitted it to his Honor’s consideration, as affecting the future punishment of the defendant. Mr Tregurtha, who on the occasion of which he speaks, appears to have been selected as the depositary of the sufferings of George Town,—and I must do that constituency the justice to say that they could not by possibility have found a better face to represent a grievance,—Mr Tregurtha, I say, on the fourth of January—three days before the publication of the newspaper containing the libel of which by this information I complain,—proceeds immediately on his landing at Launceston to the office of the Cornwall Chronicle, and unbosoms his sorrows to the sympathies of the defendant. “What now from George Town?” was the unnecessary question of Mr Goodwin, the defendant, since it was for the laudable purpose of imparting the sorrows of George Town to the Editor of the Cornwall Chronicle that Mr Tregurtha repaired to the scene in which he communicated the discontents of his townsmen. “News, I replied,” was Mr Tregurtha’s answer, “news—why the whole settlement is in an uproar;” and then he informs Mr Goodwin, that all this had originated in the circumstance of the treatment of the person called the “Gentlemen John;” who having been convicted of a most abominable offence was, notwithstanding, his conviction, said continued in the situation he held before; and that he had actually complained to the magistrate himself of having been disturbed at night, on Christmas eve I think, by the singing of Christmas carols; and that the only redress he obtained was a sneering observation from Mr Friend that he ought to be quiet delighted at being disturbed by such beautiful music. And now that you are in full possession of Mr Friend’s evidence, and that the books of the office are produced here in court at the defendant’s own desire, and although you see that for the heavy imputations hurled against Mr Friend’s head, there exists not the shadow of a foundation, you are gravely called on by the defendant’s counsel to say that he is not guilty; because, in fact, he made his paper the mere receptacle of the slanders of another. This is the argument of the learned counsel for the liberty of the Press. God forbid that on such base grounds its defence rested, for then indeed must its enemies —who are the facts of truth and justice and the friends of darkness and error—then must their triumph be complete; and that mighty power which has stood for ages and contended against, occasionally the arrogance of power, and, not seldom, the artifices of law, and always contended victoriously, then must this majestic engine fall, not from its own deficiencies, but through the mistaken zeal of its indiscreet advocates. Compare this publication, I entreat of you gentlemen of the jury, with Mr Stephen’s own definition of the Liberty of the Press. “Unless,” be observed, for I too down his words—“the liberty of the Press be a mere name it consists in the publication of such circumstances as are fit for public notice on a reasonable occasion.” Try the case before you by that test, and can you gentlemen, say that the circumstances contained in this paragraph, headed George Town, are “fit for public notice,” and that they have been “published on a reasonable occasion.” Observe the foundation on which they rest and the imputations they contain. On the first point I have already addressed you; and to those remarks I would only add, that professing to come from unquestionable authority—from one who is accurately acquainted with all that he writes—aye, and with much more than the characteristic forbearance of the defendant will furnish to the readers of his newspaper—yet the only evidence he has adduced to day is not from the man of accuracy, the writer of the letter, but from Mr Tregurtha, who seems to fill the enviable office of collector of rumours at George Town. But there is another topic upon which, Gentlemen, I should not discharge my duty did I not address you. Does or not this article contain imputations on Mr Friend, as a Magistrate and a Gentleman? Does it or not impute to him corruption in his official capacity? I have called Mr Friend before you—I have put into the box, Mr Reed, Mr Lawrence and Major Ryan. I do not mean to say that you are bound by their opinions. You have a right to judge for yourselves. But these gentlemen have unhesitatingly—some more analytically than others—given their opinions as to the imputations meant to be conveyed on the character of Mr Friend. Mr Lawrence, in particular, observed that the imputation, in his opinion, was complex; it in the first instance imputed to Mr Friend that he had passed a most inadequate sentence on the man to whose case allusion was made; and that he had subsequently and almost immediately, reinstated him in his situation; thus exhibiting indifference towards an offence to which leniency was peculiarly reprehensible. Mr Reed, again considered the matter as affecting Mr Friend’s character both as a magistrate and a gentleman; and Major Ryan thought that it clearly attributed to him a connivance at that very guilt, with which Mr Friend, in his magisterial character, had become satisfactorily acquainted. But let me ask, gentlemen, at what order conclusion can you arrive? When you see the words “at his house” printed in italics, can you, in the exercise of the utmost charity, arrive at a different conclusion from the witnesses? True you have the disclaimed of the defendant’s counsel that he never so intended to apply those terms; but language must be judged of by itsordinary and natural meaning, and it is not the disclaimer made at the eleventh hour that can change the character, or alter the tendency, of this libel. But the disclaimer is accompanied by an argument the object of which is to convince you that this article is no libel, in the sense in which it is charged in this information; because it does not impute corruption to Mr Friend. What! then connivance in a magistrate at escape from punishment due to a most heinous and revolting offence is no longer to be deemed corruption? Is this the doctrine of my learned friend? This the conclusion at which he would persuade you to arrive? Corruption—he exclaims—where is it imputed? The article might and probably did, according to my learned friend’s construction of it, attribute to Mr Friend undesirable conduct,—or injudicious or improper conduct,—but no man in his senses, according to Mr Stephen, could say that there was any charge of corruption made against him; and if any such construction were forced upon the words, he, on the part of his client, solemnly disclaims ever having entertained any such intention. Gentlemen, on this subject, I say hear the evidence—read thearticle—and if you can attach to the language used any other meaning than that which this information ascribes to it, then let the defendant have the benefit of your opinion. Not however on account of his disclaimer—but because you believe conscientiously that there is not in the matter set forth as libellous a charge of corruption preferred against Mr Friend, in his magisterial capacity.
But, as I observed at the commencement of this address, the evidence of Mr Tregurtha is not only presented to you for the purpose of obtaining your verdict, it is addressed also to his Honor in the event of your verdict passing against the defendant; and I have, in this latter point of view, pronounced it of a most mischievous tendency. I now most confidently submit to his Honor, that the attempt made here to-day to defend the present, by ruining the reputation of the absent, is one of the most unfair and unconstitutional proceedings ever tolerated in a Court of Justice, and that this Court will, in due season by an example which it will be then be in its competency to make, discourage the repetition of attempts such as these, which would convert the proceedings of Courts of Justice into an arena where, to gratify malice or to escape punishment justly due to crime, the character of the absent is to be immolated without remorse; and, as far as the victim is concerned, without redress. On this subject I utter not one word more—I appeal to His Honor, to you, gentlemen, and to every Englishman who hears me, whether or not the course adopted by my learned friend on this occasion—with reference exclusively, let me be understood, to this part of his case—was not directly calculated to cast a foul stain on the administration of justice.
Gentlemen, there is but one topic more; and as it is one in which I am personally concerned, I shall occupy but a very few moments of your attention in discussing it. It has been asked—why has Mr Friend not brought a civil action for his libel? My answer is, because I deemed it imperative on me to prosecute this case by ex officio information. I think so still. I am not here accountable for the motives by which I was actuated in this determination; though I have no doubt they will be justly and fairly appreciated by men of all parties; but this I will say, that amongst some novel doctrine, and dangerous argument, this case has at all events so terminated as to exhibit Mr Friend’s character to the Government he serves, as well as to his fellow citizens, unhurt in the least degree by the fiery ordeal to which it has been subjected.
His Honor briefly charged the jury. The questions, for their consideration, his Honor stated were two. First—Did the letter charged as libellous reflect upon Capt Friend in the three offices referred to. Secondly—if it did, did it or did it not charge the said Captain Friend with corruption in those offices.
The jury after a short consideration returned a verdict of Guilty.
Mr Goodwin being called up for judgment; Mr Stephen moved an arrest of judgment. In doing so, he shortly adverted to his previous arguments, that corruption had not been imputed. He admitted however, that (but for the objections he meant now to urge against the conviction, in point of law,) the verdict of the jury on that head would be conclusive. He adverted also to the decision of his Honor, not to receive any affidavits, or affidavit in mitigation of punishment,—Mr Stephen then took the following objections:
First, That there was no averment in the information, that Mr Friend was acting as resident magistrate and port officer at the time when the man is said to have been released or reinstated; and secondly, that there was no averment or innuendo that the reinstating of the man, or the impunity extended to him, was the act of Mr Friend. Consequently Mr Stephen contended, there was nothing in the libel itself which, in terms—or explained by innuendo—whence the Court had a right to infer the imputation of corruption upon Mr Friend.
His Honor deferred the decision of the Court upon Mr Stephen’s motion until the first day of next term, Mr Goodwin entering into recognizances to appear.
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The Cornwall Chronicle, Sat 14 Apr 1838 5
SUPREME COURT
CRIMINAL SIDE – Monday, April 9.
Before his Honor Chief Justice Pedder, and a Military Jury.
Regina v. Goodwin.—Ex-officio—After the Clerk had read the Indictment—the Attorney General rose and stated to the Court, that this was an information that he had felt it his duty to file against William Lushington Goodwin, Printer, Publisher and Proprietor of a newspaper known by the name of the Cornwall Chronicle—for having on the 6th January last, published in that Journal, a wicked, wilful and malicious Libel on the character of Lieutenant Friend, the Resident Magistrate at George Town, with a view to lessen him in the estimation of the Public. The defendant pleaded “Not Guilty.”—The article alluded to was as follows:—[see 6 January 1838 Cornwall Chronicle article above]
The Learned Counsel then continued:—the charges contained in this article are so palpably calculated to produce that effect to the character of Lieutenant Friend alluded to in the indictment, that it would be almost superfluous to call the attention of the Court to the circumstance. There could be no doubt left on the mind of any person present, who has listened to the article just now read, as to what was the object of its publication; and it was equally evident that by “the Resident Magistrate of George Town and the Port Officer,” was meant Lieutenant Friend, both those situations having been held by that Gentleman before and after the publication of the article complained of;—true that it was, the name of Lieutenant Friend did not occur in any part of it, but the allusion to the situations which he held was sufficient to ensure his identity. The Attorney General here went through the whole article, dwelling on particular parts of it, and pointing out to the Jury such portions of it as evidence of that identity. The Learned Counsel went on to shew, that this libel imputed by implication, corrupt conduct to Lieutenant Friend in his magisterial capacity, and therein lays all the sting of the libel, for, after representing that one of the signal men who had been charged before the Resident Magistrate with the commission of an unnatural offence, and of whose guilt the evidence adduced before the magistrate (meaning of course Lieut Friend,) appeared “so satisfactory, that he sentenced him to a chain gang for a certain period, and yet within the lapse of a very short time, he was permitted to walk about the streets of George Town, and serenade the inhabitants at night, having also been reinstated in his birth of signal-man.” Now he (the Attorney General,) would say, that the impression such statement was naturally calculated to produce on the public mind was, that Lieutenant Friend must have received some valuable consideration, in money orotherwise, for this apparently misapplied lenity, and thus involved the idea of corruption. It would be for the Jury to say, whether a licentious Press would be thus permitted to vilify and degrade at pleasure any member of society, no matter how respectable his character, or exulted his station. It would not be necessary to call evidence to prove that Mr Goodwin was the publisher of the article complained of as libellous, as that gentleman’s Counsel was willing to admit that point.
The Attorney General then called —
MC Friend—I am Resident Magistrate at George Town and Port Officer of the Port of Launceston; I am one of the Justices of the Peace of this Island; I have read the article headed “George Town” in the Cornwall Chronicle now produced; I have read it before today; I think the article intended to convey imputations on my character; I think it would point out that I was ignorant of my duty as a Magistrate, in trying a man on a charge I was not competent to try him for; I could only have committed him for trial on such a charge; and secondly, that, at least, I must be a man indifferent to a crime at which every one else shudders.
Cross-examined,—There was a man employed as a signal-man prior to the publication of this article, named John Dubbins; He was a transported offender; he was charged before me with an offence before the publication of that article; the charge was made on the 13th of December; it was, that Dubbins had harboured a boy in his hut, who was out of the Penitentiary after hours; the record book of the Police Office which I now produce contains the evidence which the sentence under that charge was awarded; the sentence of Dubbins was two months to a road-gang and hard labor; the boy was sentenced to seven days in the cells; the charge was not for an unnatural offence; had it been so I could not have finally decided on the case, it must have gone to a jury; the charge and evidence as contained in the record produced, were public proceedings at the Police office at George Town; Dubbins was sent to a road party immediately after his sentence; he was sent to the George Town road party, where I always send men under sentence to the roads until the Governor has appointed a particular party in which they are to be employed; after he had been sent to the George Town road party, and before his Excellency had named the party in which he was to undergo his sentence, I was obliged to recall him to the signal station to teach another man the signals; he was not reinstated in his office—on the contrary, he was not permitted to sleep even in his hut, as formerly, he attended the duty by day, and was locked in the cells at night; his sentence was never remitted; he was in George Town during the Christmas season; I have been told that he went round the town with the singers on the Christmas Eve; it never occurred but that one night; I do not speak in answer to the two last questions of my own knowledge; I have made enquiries, and I believe the singing only occurred the one night; the road gang at George Town is not a chain-gang; it would not in fact be termed a road-gang officially; it is a gang of disposable men who are thus made use of for public benefit; the signal station is about 100 feet from my house; I do not remember any information being made officially by Mr Tregurtha of the insubordination of the prisoners during the Christmas season; nor, officially, upon the subject of this man serenading upon the Christmas Eve; there certainly was not any insubordination to my knowledge about that time, amongst the prisoners at George Town.
Re-examined—Dubbins was sent immediately from the Police Office to the George Town road party, remained there a short time and was then brought back to the signal-station, where he remained about a fortnight or three weeks, instructing a man I intended for the station; I then received information of the gang to which the Governor had directed the prisoner should be send, and I sent him off at the first eligible opportunity; I believe this to have been the case, from its being my usual practice in similar cases; it is generally a fortnight after the sentence has been transmitted to the Governor, before I receive instructions as to the destiny of the sentenced men; it may then be a week or two before I can remove them, waiting as escort; during this time I employ them as before stated in the road gang at George Town.
Mr Henry Reed,—I have looked at the Cornwall Chronicle produced; I have read the article headed “George Town;” I believe the article is intended to convey an imputation against Captain Friend; to my mind it would convey that Mr Friend considered, by the evidence in the case referred to, that the man was guilty of the crime, but, from some improper motives, instead of taking the steps which the law directed, he merely sentenced the offender to a road-gang; and that even this sentence was after remitted.
Cross-examined—I do not find any comment upon the leniency of the sentence in the publication; it is therein stated, that the magistrate was satisfied with the evidence produced,—notwithstanding he only sentenced the man to a road-party; if so convinced, he could not have known his duty to have thus acted; or, knowing it, he must have been actuated by improper motives in acting as is charged in this article.
Mr HE Lawrence,—I have read the article referred to; I have seen it before; I should say, in general terms, that the article is calculated to throw odium and reproach on the character of Captain Friend as a magistrate and as a gentleman. The imputation appears to me complex; first, he is charged with trying an offence to which his powers as a magistrate did not extend: secondly, with relieving the offender from the effects of that sentence,—the crime being one in which the exercise of lenity is peculiarly offensive to the world.
Major Ryan, 50th regt.—I have read the article referred to; the article conveys to my mind an imputation injurious to the character of Captain Friend; it seems to attribute to him a connivance with the man so charged,—most discreditable to his character as a gentleman and a magistrate; the words “at the house” in this paragraph are not in the same print as the rest of the article—they are in italics. This closed the case for the prosecution.
Mr Stephen for the defence, commenced by expressing regret that the mode of prosecution resorted to, had been an ex-officio information; since he presumes, that the article complained of being one reflecting on individual character. The setting right of that character was the point aimed at—an end—which was not, nevertheless, fully to be attained by a criminal prosecution, the object of which was, chiefly, punishment. He begged the Jury to bear in mind the peculiar position of a newspaper editor, liable occasionally to fall into inaccuracy of statement, even with the best intentions; to consider his duties, for every editor had duties to discharge, though he assumed them voluntarily, and to make proper allowance for unintentional errors in their performance, for the sake of the great public interests which the press was confessedly so well calculated to promote.
He lamented that it had not been thought a better course in this instance, to try the nature of Mr Friend’s injuries, and the extent of Mr Goodwin’s delinquency, in a civil action, where the truth of the supposed charges would be directly an issue, and the excuse which the defendant meant to offer, that he originally had reason to believe them, would better, and more satisfactorily to the public, be decided. He stood not there to defend or extenuate any private libel. Mr Goodwin had not assaulted private character; had not referred to any private matters; had not intruded into the friendly circle, or invaded the domestic hearth. He was guilty, if of anything, of calling public attention, and the attention of government, to what he rightly deemed a matter of very great public importance; to the negligence, or the indiscretion, the remissness, or the erroneous judgement of a public officer,—in relation to a public question; in which the Government and the public were deeply interested and on which the conduct of Mr Friend was fairly, and indeed necessarily open to public remark and scrutiny. Mr Goodwin, the editor of a public journal, receives information from more than one credible and respectable source, that a man employed in the Port Officer’s department, had been charged with a scandalous offence; and sentenced for it, by that officer as a resident magistrate, to a chain gang. It now turns out, that the charge and sentence were not for that offence, but for harbouring; and the sentence was, not to a chain gang, but to a road party. Grievous errors! But, they are not errors affecting the charge, as complained of in this prosecution. Even if they were so, however, he (Mr Stephen) would contend, that in effect the charge really was, and he would prove that at George Town, it was universally understood to be, what Mr Goodwin’s informant told him it was. Let the jury consider the facts, as proved in evidence against the man; and they would see that such an understanding was not altogether without foundation; but, be this decided as it may, the material point in debate is the same. The article was not complained of, as imputing to Mr Friend any impropriety, or error, in the entertaining of that charge, or the passing of that sentence; but, as imputing to Mr Friend impropriety, or error, in not causing that sentence to be immediately carried into effect. And, on this point, (the only material one for present consideration), it is already in proof that Mr Goodwin’s information was substantially correct. The man was not removed to a road party; he was not subjected to that restraint which might have been expected to follow such a sentence; he walked the streets openly by day; he resorted as usual to his old berth, the signal station; and, nearly a fortnight after his conviction, he was allowed to perambulate the township serenading its inhabitants at midnight.. These things were communicated to MrGoodwin; he received them from more than one quarter; he was informed, that they were matters of notoriety, and topics of general complaint; and he published them accordingly. He (Mr Stephen) would contend, that such topics were peculiarly proper for public notice; and such as the press, if its usefulness were not wholly disclaimed, and its liberty treated as but a mere name, was entitled to deem within its cognizance. He did not know what there was in the liberty of the press, if it included not the right to publishing, on a fitting occasion, circumstances proper for public comment.
And where shall we find an instance of such an occasion, or of circumstances of such a character, if they exist not here? Public and general rumour; public and common discontent; public and notorious observation; directed to the mistaken lenity, or injudicious delay, of a convicting magistrate, in carrying into effect the punishment justly awarded to crime:- this is the occasion which has produced, and which justifies, the present publication. He would maintain, that, if the law forbad such a publication, under such circumstances as these, and if that law were to be rigorously, as here, by an ex-officio information, newspapers had better at once cease; their editors could not exist in safety a week; the Press would be destroyed. He would, however, for the purposes of the present defence, be content even to pass by these all-important topics. He begged the Jury to bear in mind, what the present charge was. It was not that Mr Goodwin imputed to Mr Friend remissness, neglect, supineness, want of knowledge, defect of judgment, culpable error. That the article in question imputed these, or some of these,—that it charged Mr Friend with impropriety of some kind,—he did not think it worthwhile to dispute. But the information alleged that the defendant imputed to Mr Friend far grosser impropriety; a degree, and a species of impropriety, of imputing which to Mr Friend, he, (Mr Stephen) had his client’s solemn assurance, that he never entertained the idea for one moment. The information states, that Mr Goodwin’s article imputed to Mr Friend, that, in the discharge of his office, he had been guilty of corruption. The article, Mr Stephen submitted with confidence, imputed nothing of the sort. He contended, that no portion of the article justified such a construction. What insinuation was there, in any part of the article that Mr Friend had done,—or, rather omitted to do,—that which it was insisted it was his duty to have done, from the base motive of personal gain, or benefit to himself of any kind?—or, of any private and selfish consideration, having been the moving cause? But unless such an insinuation were really conveyed in the article, how could it fairly be said to impute to Mr Friend corruption? What, is it not possible for a magistrate to misunderstand or neglect his duty,—aye, and grossly too,—without being guilty of corruption? He begged them on this point, on which his client had already solemnly disclaimed any such intention, to judge of the article for themselves; to discriminate carefully between the meaning, by considering well the import and value of words; and not, by returning a verdict of guilty which,—setting aside all other considerations favoring an acquittal,—would force unnaturally on Mr Goodwin’s language, or that of his correspondent, a meaning which, he would venture to say, never entered the imagination of either.
The learned gentleman then called Edward Primrose Tregurtha—I have read the paragraph referred to in the Cornwall Chronicle of January 6; I recollect reading that journal a few days after its publication; before its publication I knew a man of the name of John Dubbings, or “Gentleman John;” previous to the publication I had a conversation with the defendant, Mr Goodwin, at his office, relative to this man; at the time of that conversation general rumours had existed in George Town relative to Dubbings; rumours which created a very strong feeling in the place at that time; the rumours so far as relates to the offence charged against Dubbins, were, that he had been brought up to the Police Office for an unnatural crime; it was a general report; I do not recollect any general rumour as to what he was really sentenced to a road party for; as near as I remember, I told Mr Goodwin, in the conversation alluded to, that George Town was all in an uproar in consequence of this man, Dubbins, after the general rumours that he had committed such a crime, being permitted to be at large, and singing, with others, about the streets, at midnight; I further stated to Mr Goodwin, that a few days after this occurred I asked the Chief Constable by whose permission he was allowed to be at large, and he said by Captain Friend’s permission; I further told Mr Goodwin that I myself had seen the man about the town after his conviction, quite at large. I believe I asked Captain Friend a short time afterward if it was by his permission that Dubbins was serenading the town on Christmas, waking people at midnight; he did not answer me, but said, in a sneering kind of way, “I think we ought to feel much obliged to them for being awoke at such an hour, with such delightful music;” I told Mr Goodwin that I had seen him at large and idling about the town with a book, after being sentenced; I found Dubbins absent when I returned to George Town from Launceston.
Cross examined—It was about two days before the publication that I conversed with Mr Goodwin on the subject referred to; I returned to George Town on the 7th; the paragraphs was published on the 6th; I did not see Dubbins on my return home, I have not seen him since; I do not know that he had been sent away then.
The Attorney General in reply spoke to the following effect—It seems then—may it please your Honor and gentlemen of the Jury—that this evidence of Mr Tregurtha, about the most extraordinary I eve heard offered in a court of justice, is intended to have the effect of inducing you to believe that the insertion of this libelious[sic] article in the Cornwall Chronicle, proceeded from the most laudable motives on the part of the defendant; or, if that gentleman’s testimony fails in that respect, then it is addressed to the consideration of the court in mitigation of the defendant’s punishment. Viewing it, gentlemen, in either of these tendencies, I must say it does appear to me “passing strange,” that so discriminating a mind as that of my learned friend should, even in the extremities of his case, have caught at an argument so utterly destitute of value in the sense in which he has urged it on your consideration; and not only valueless, but most mischievous, in the sense in which he has submitted it to his Honor’s consideration, as affecting the future punishment of the defendant. Mr Tregurtha, who on the occasion of which he speaks, appears to have been selected as the depository of the of the sufferings of George Town—and I must do that constituency the justice to say that they could not by possibility have found a better face to represent a grievance—Mr Tregurtha, I say, on the fourth January—three days before the publication of the newspaper containing the libel of which by this information I complain—proceeds immediately on his landing at Launceston to the office of the Cornwall Chronicle, and unbosoms his sorrows to the sympathies of the defendant. “What news from George Town?” was the unnecessary question of Mr Goodwin, the defendant, since it was for the laudable purpose of imparting the sorrows of George Town to the editor of the Cornwall Chronicle, that Mr Tregurtha repaired to the scene in which he communicated the discontents of his townsmen. “News, I replied,” was Mr Tregurtha’s answer, “news—why the whole settlement is in an uproar;” and then he informs Mr Goodwin, that all this had originated in the circumstance of the treatment of the person called “Gentleman John;” who having been convicted of a most abominable offence was, notwithstanding his conviction, still continued in the situation he held before: and that he had actually complained to the magistrate himself, of having been disturbed at night, on Christmas-eve I think, by the singing of Christmas carols; and that the only redress he obtained was a sneering observation from Mr Friend, that he ought to be quite delighted at being disturbed by such beautiful music. And now that you are in full possession of Mr Friend’s evidence, and that the books of the office are produced here in court at the defendant’s own desire, and although you see that for the heavy imputations hurled against Mr Friend’s head, there exists not the shadow of a foundation, you are gravely called on by the defendant’s counsel to say that he is not guilty; because, in fact, he made his paper the mere receptacle of the slanders of another. This is the argument of the learned counsel for the liberty of the Press. God forbid that on which base grounds its defence rested, for then indeed must its enemies—who are the foes of truth and justice and the friends of darkness and error—then must their triumph be complete; and that mighty power which has stood for ages and contended against, occasionally, the arrogance of power, and, not seldom, the artifices of law, and always contended victoriously, then must this majestic engine fall, not from its own deficiencies, but through the mistaken zeal of its indiscreet advocates. Compare this publication I entreat of you, gentlemen of the jury, with Mr Stephen’s own definition of the Liberty of the Press. “Unless,” he observed, for I took down his words—“the liberty of the Press be a mere name, it consists in the publication of such circumstances as are fit for the public notice on a reasonable occasion.” Try the case before you by that test, and can you, gentlemen, say that the circumstances contained in this paragraph, headed “George Town,” are “fit for public notice,” and that they have been “published on a reasonable occasion.” Observe the foundation on which they rest and the imputations they contain. On the first point I have already addressed you; and to these remarks I would only add, that professing to come from unquestionable authority—from one who is accurately acquainted with all that he writes,—aye, and with much more than the characteristic forbearance of the defendant will furnish to the readers of his newspaper—yet the only evidence he has adduced to day is not from the man of accuracy, the writer of the letter, but from Mr Tregurtha, who seems to fill the enviable office of collector of rumours at George Town. But there is another topic, upon which, Gentlemen, I should not discharge my duty did I not address you. Does, or does not this article contain imputations on Mr Friend, as a Magistrate and a Gentleman? Does it not impute to him corruption in his official capacity? I have called Mr Friend before you—I have put into the box Mr Reed, Mr Lawrence, and Major Ryan. I do not mean to say that you are bound by their opinions. You have a right to judge for yourselves. But these gentlemen have unhesitatingly—some more analytically than others—given their opinions as to the imputations meant to be conveyed on the character of Mr Friend. Mr Lawrence, in particular, observed that the imputation, in his opinion, was complex: it in the first instance imputed to Mr Friend that he had passed a most inadequate sentence on the man to whose case allusion was made; and that he had subsequently, and almost immediately, reinstated him in his situation; thus exhibiting indifference towards an offence to which leniency was peculiarly reprehensible. Mr Reed again, considered the matter as affecting Mr Friend’s character both as a magistrate and a gentleman; and Major Ryan thought that it clearly attributed to him a connivance at that very guilt, with which Mr Friend, in his magisterial character, had become satisfactorily acquainted. But let me ask, gentlemen,, att what other conclusion can you arrive? When you see the words “at his house” printed in italics, can you, in the exercise of the utmost charity, arrive at a different conclusion from the witnesses? True, you have the disclaimer of the defendant’s counsel that he never so intended to apply those terms; but language must be judged of by its ordinary and natural meaning, and it is not the disclaimer made at the eleventh hour that can change the character, or alter the tendency, of this libel. But the disclaimer is accompanied by an argument, the object of which is to convince you that this article is no libel, in the sense in which it is charged in this information; because it does not impute corruption to Mr Friend. What! Then connivance in a magistrate at escape from punishment due to a most heinous and revolting offence is no longer to be deemed corruption? Is this the doctrine of my learned friend; This the conclusion at which he would have you arrive? Corruption—he exclaims—where is it imputed? The article might, and probably did, according to me learned friend’s construction of it, attribute to Mr Friend undesirable conduct—or injudicious or improper conduct—but no man in his senses, according to Mr Stephen, could say, that there was any charge of corruption made against him; and if any such construction were forced upon the words, he, on the part of his client, solemnly disclaims every having entertained any such intention. Gentlemen, on this subject, I say, hear the evidence—read the article—and if you can attach to the language used, any other meaning than that which this information ascribes to is, then let the defendant have the benefit of your opinion. Not, however, on account of his disclaimer—but because you believe conscientiously that there is no in the matter set forth as libellous, a charge of corruption preferred against Mr Friend, in his magisterial capacity
But, as I observed at the commencement of this address, the evidence of Mr Tregurtha is not only presented to you for the purpose of obtaining your verdict, it is addressed also to his Honor, in the event of your verdict passing against the defendant: and I have, in this latter point of view, pronounced it of a most mischievous tendency. I now most confidently submit to his Honor, that the attempt made here today to defend the present, by ruining the reputation of the absent, is one of the most unfair and unconstitutional proceedings ever tolerated in a Court of Justice, and that this Court will, in due season, by an example, which it will be then in its competency to make, discourage the repetition of attempts such as these, which would convert the proceedings of Courts of Justice into an arena where, to gratify malice or to escape punishment justly due to crime, the character of the absent is to be immolated without remorse, and, as far as the victim is concerned, without redress. On this subject I utter not one word more—I appeal to his Honor, to you, gentlemen, and to every Englishman who hears me, whether or not the course adopted by my learned friend on this occasion—with reference exclusively, let me be understood, to this part of his case—was not directly calculated to cast a foul stain on the administration of justice.
Gentlemen, there is but one topic more; and as it is one in which I am personally concerned, I shall occupy but a very few moments of your attention in discussing it. It was been asked—why has Mr Friend not brought a civil action for this libel? My answer is, because I deemed it imperative on me to prosecute this case by ex-officio information. I think so still. I am not here accountable for the motives by which I was actuated in this determination; though I have no doubt they will be justly and fairly appreciated by men of all parties; but this I will say, that amongst some novel doctrine, and dangerous argument, this case has at all events so terminated as to exhibit Mr Friend’s character to the Government he serves, as well as to his fellow citizens, unhurt in the least degree by the fiery ordeal to which it has been subjected.
His Honor briefly charged the Jury. The questions for their consideration, his Honor stated, were two. First, did the letter charged as libellous reflect upon Captain Friend in the three offices referred to. Secondly—If it did, did it, or did it not charge the said Captain Friend with corruption in those offices.
The jury, after a short consultation, returned a verdict of—Guilty.
Mr Goodwin being called up for judgement; Mr Stephen moved an arrest of judgement. In doing so, he shortly adverted to his previous arguments, that corruption had not been imputed. He admitted, however, that (but for the objections, he meant now to urge against the conviction, in point of law, the verdict of the just on that head would be conclusive). He adverted also to the decision of hid Honor, not to receive any affidavits, or affidavit, in mitigation of punishment.—Mr Stephen then took the following objections:—
First, That there was no averment in the information that Mr Friend was acting as resident magistrate and port officer at the time when the man is said to have been released or reinstated; and secondly, that there was no averment or innuendo that the reinstating of the man, or the impunity extended to him, was the act of Mr Friend. Consequently, Mr Stephen contended, there was nothing in the libel itself which, in terms—or explained by inuendo, [sic] whence the court had a right to infer the imputation of corruption upon Mr Friend.
His Honor deferred the decision of the court upon Mr Stephen’s motion until the first day of the next term, Mr Goodwin entering into recognizances to appear.
Counsel for the Prosecution—The Attorney General;—Counsel for the Defence—Mr Alfred Stephen.
Comment on the Ex-Officio proceedings against the proprietor of this paper, as they appear by report in this number, are superfluous. The verdict was, no doubt, according to law, that is, the defendant was pronounced GUILTY for having in substance, as it was clearly and fully established by evidence, written the truth, and nothing but the truth, which according to the law of Ex-Officio, is guilty of the greatest magnitude. It being “immaterial with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the matter of it be true or false;” the old adage, “the greater the truth the greater the libel,” is plainly verified in the late proceedings. No one can entertain a doubt as to the verdict that would have been returned, had the matter charged as libellous been submitted to the test of a civil action—for, according to Blackstone, we find, that “in a civil action, a libel must appear to be false as well as scandalous, for if the charge be true, the plaintiff has received no private injury, and has no ground to demand a compensation for himself, whatever offence it may be against the public peace, and, therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the accusation may be pleaded in bar of suit.”
We have no occasion, we are assured, to make any observation in explanation of our conduct, a faithful report of the trial (which we have preferred copying from the columns of the ADVERTISER than using our own notes) is before the Public. It explains the FACTS!
One remark it is our duty to make; relative to the forced construction of words put upon the article of Lieutenant Friend. We did not in writing it, neither did the writer of the letter (copied into it) contemplate the charge of CORRUPTION against Lieutenant Friend.
Rather that it should be supposed our report of the above proceedings was prejudiced, we have, for the most part, extracted it from our contemporary, the LAUNCESTON ADVERTISER, who, having omitted (no doubt unintentionally) the substance of the charge against “Gentleman John,” as it was read by Mr Stephen from the record book of the Police Office at George Town, it becomes our duty to supply the omission:—
December 13th—William Smith, a boy, was charged by constable ------- with being found in the hut of John Dubbings on the night previous, undressed, and in his bed. Prisoner in his defence, said, he returned too late from the Heads to get into the Penitentiary. Sentence, 7 days in the cells.
December 13th—John Dubbings was charged by constable ------- with HARBOURING the boy, William Smith. He stated that he watched the boy enter Dubbings’s hut at 9 o’clock, and that at 12 o’clock he asked if the boy was there; Dubbings denied that he was, but, upon the constable getting admittance to the hut, he found the boy undressed, and in his bed. Dubbings said he had taken him in, because he came from the Heads too late to get into the Penitentiary. Sentence two months to a road party, and hard labor.
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The Cornwall Chronicle, Sat 19 May 1838 6
This morning (Tuesday, May 15,) the Court decided that the objections taken by Mr Stephen in the case of Captain Goodwin, of the CORNWALL CHRONICLE, were well founded, and that gentleman was discharged accordingly.
TO MR WL GOODWIN,
PROPRIETOR OF THE CORNWALL CHRONICLE
Sir,—The news of your discharge from the verdict against you in the Supreme Court, for libel, has given universal delight amongst your townspeople; this has not only arisen from a general opinion that the article upon which you were convicted was not libellous, but a fair and correct report of certain transactions and magisterial delinquencies which occurred at George Town, and for publishing which you deserved thanks rather than censure, but more so from the prosecution against you having been conducted by ex-officio information, a mode of trial never resorted to but for the protection and support of tyrannical powers.
It is the duty of every man to express his indignation at an attempt like this to destroy the Liberty of the Press, and stifle the voice of public opinion; and exceedingly illiberal indeed must be the mind of that man, who would desire to shield himself from public blame by virtue of an ex-officio prosecution against the conductor of a Newspaper, whilst he had a remedy to his supposed grievances by civil action.
I have heard Lieutenant Friend described as a very kind hearted man; it is therefore the much surprising he should have sentenced the fellow called Gentleman John, to two months in chains for doing an act of kindness in opening his door and giving shelter during the night to the youth who had been shut out of the prisoner’s barracks; hard and severe indeed would have been such a sentence, if that had been truly the accusation against this gentleman of foreign propensities.
Mr Friend surely must have heard what this man was banished for, the offence he had been publicly accused of before in Launceston, and the general report of his character, if not (as Police Magistrate) he ought to have been acquainted with these matters, and to have acted accordingly. His restoring such a man to his office, and permitting him to enjoy those liberties at George Town (which were proved on your trial to have been the case,) was exceedingly remiss and improper in him, and justly deserved exposure from you and rebuke from the government.
Wishing, Sir, your Paper may continue to expose public abuses, and, conducted on liberal principles, open to all and influenced by none, and that the Government or its officers may never again attempt by ex-officio information, or other tyrannical means to muzzle the Press or ruin its conductors,—I am, Sir, your’s, &c.,
AN ADVOCATE FOR THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.
May 18, 1838.
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Colonial Times, Tue 29 May 1838 7
Mr Goodwin’s Acquittal.—Liberty of the Press.
The first ex-officio information (as we believe) filed by our present Attorney-General, for libel, has met with a most signal and a triumphant defeat; Captain Goodwin, the proprietor and conductor of the Cornwall Chronicle, being discharged by the Court, after a sapient Jury of Esquires had pronounced him guilty of libel! This is good; and we shall long remember it. Nothing could exceed the exultation, with which Captain Goodwin was received by his fellow-townsmen, on his returning to Launceston. At Perth, he was met by a numerous assemblage of his friends, which increased, as he proceeded, and he was escorted into Launceston by an immense concourse of people, and a long line of carriages and horsemen, both young and old, cheering vehemently, as he passed along in Cox’s coach. The feeling is so strong, on the other side, (and, we hope,here), that a liberal subscription will be collected, for the purpose of defraying the expenses, attendant upon a prosecution, universally considered vexatious and uncalled for. Here, then, is a victory in behalf of the palladium of British Liberty, as gratifying, as it will prove beneficial; for, we contend, heartily and fearlessly, that a Free Press is essentially requisite in a community, so far distant from the seat of Government,—and so exposed to the petty tyranny, and vexatious annoyance of “Men in office.”
We think the Attorney-General must feel rather piqued at this result of his prosecution. We had, till now, supposed, that, with all his amusing peculiarities, Mr McDowall possessed a liberal, and rather capacious, mind; when, however, we look upon this case, in all its bearings, and, especially, when we consider the comparative harmlessness of the imputed libel, we must change our mind, and recant our opinion, till further experience will enable us to confirm it.
If the Attorney-General is so anxious to preserve the public peace, and to punish and prevent the licentiousness of the press, why does he not direct his power to the castigation of a band of slanderers, who, week after week, disgrace themselves, the community, and the press, by a course of procedure, infamous in the extreme? The avowed object of these men—as displayed in their general conduct—is to provoke breaches of the peace,—by bullying and black-guardism,—of the most obscene and furious description. Why, we should like to know, are they permitted to pursue so wicked a course, not only without check ort hindrance—but with actual encouragement? We will yield to no one, in the strictest veneration for the freedom of the press; but when that freedom degenerates into the most disreputable licentiousness; and when we see it made the instrument of personal malignity and slander, our veneration is changed into utter scorn, contempt, and detestation.
With reference to Captain Goodwin, we have heard, that a subscription will be made here, to aid in defraying the very heavy expences, [sic] to which he has been exposed, as well by the prosecution, in the first instance, as by the delay of the Court in the second. So soon as we can ascertain further particulars on this head, we shall use every exertion to make them known, and appreciated.
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The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser, Sat 16 Jun 1838 8
HOBART TOWN NEWS.
————
MR GOODWIN’S ACQUITTAL—LIBERTY
OF THE PRESS.
The first ex-officio information (as we believe) filed by our present Attorney General, for libel, has met with a most signal and a triumphant defeat; Captain Goodwin, the proprietor and conductor of the Cornwall Chronicle, being discharged by the court, after a sapient Jury of Esquires had pronounced him guilty of libel! This is good; and we shall long remember it. Nothing could exceed the exultation, with which Captain Goodwin was received by his fellow-townsmen, on his returning to Launceston. At Perth, he was met by a numerous assemblage of his friends, which increased, as he proceeded, and he was escorted into Launceston by an immense concourse of people, and a long line of carriages and horse-men, both young and old, cheering vehemently, as he passed along in Cox’s coach. The feeling is so strong on the other side, (and, we hope,here,) that a liberal subscription will be collected, for the purpose of defraying the expenses, attendant upon a prosecution, universally considered vexatious and uncalled for. Here, then, is a victory in behalf of the palladium of British Liberty, as gratifying, as it will prove beneficial; for, we contend, and fearlessly, that a free press is essentially requisite in a community, so far distant from the seat of Government—and so exposed to the petty tyranny, and vexatious annoyance of— “Men in office.”
We think the Attorney General must feel rather piqued at this result of his prosecution. We had, till now, supposed, that, with all his amusing peculiarities, Mr McDowall possessed a liberal, and rather capacious mind; when, however, we look upon this case, in all its bearings, and, especially, when we consider the comparative harmlessness of the imputed libel, we must change our mind, and recant our opinion, till further experience will enable us to confirm it.
If the Attorney General is so anxious to preserve the public peace, and to punish and prevent the licentiousness of the press, why does he not direct his power to the castigation of a band of slanderers, who, week after week disgrace themselves, the community, and the press, by a course of procedure, infamous in the extreme? The avowed object of these men—as displayed in their general conduct—is to provoke breaches of the peace—by bullying and blackguardism, of the most obscene and furious description. Why, we should like to know, are they permitted to pursue so wicked a course, not only without check ort hindrance—but with actual encouragement? We will yield to no one, in the strictest veneration for the freedom of the press; but when that freedom degenerates into the most disreputable licentiousness; and when we see it made the instrument of personal malignity and slander, our veneration is changed into utter scorn, contempt, and detestation.
With reference to Captain Goodwin, we have heard, that a subscription will be made here to aid in defraying the very heavy expenses to which he has been exposed, as well by the prosecution, in the first instance, as by the delay of the court in the second. So soon as we can ascertain further particulars on the head, we shall use every exertion to make them known, and appreciated.
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We understand that a new arrangement is about to be effected as regards the Roman Catholic Priesthood of the colony. The Rev Mr Therry, of Sydney, is to take charge of the Hobart Town Congregation, while Mr Watkins goes to Richmond, and Mr Cotham to Launceston.
1 The Cornwall Chronicle, Sat 6 Jan 1838, p. 2.
2 The Launceston Advertiser, Thu 12 Apr 1838, p. 3. Tried 9 Apr 1838 before Chief Justice Pedder, Van Diemen’s Land Supreme Court. Emphasis added.
3 William Lushington Goodwin (1798?-1862), reached Sydney, from Kent, England, per Kains as master of the convict during Mar1831. He applied unsuccessfully for the port officer position at Launceston during 1832. In 1835 ‘he became editor and then proprietor of the newly established Cornwall Cronicle.’ ‘In 1838 he accused the port officer, MC Friend, of official neglect, peculation and homosexuality … [and] Goodwin was forced to pay a £400 fine.’ Goodwin d. 5 Aug 1862 at the Grove, George Town. ADB, 1788-1850, vol. 1, pp. 457-8.
4 Matthew Curling Friend (1792-1871), b. 21 Jan 1792, at Ramsgate, England. ‘In Apr 1830, as master of the Wanstead, he arrived in Hobart Town … he left for England in May’ again. He returned another time in Jul 1832 as master of the Norval and became Launceston’s port officer in Sep 1832. Friend’s ‘appointment marked the beginning of a long feud with WL Goodwin, his rival for the position.’ ‘So bitter was his [Goodwin’s] attack of 6 Jan 1838 that Sir John Franklin, whose friendship Friend had won, ordered an inquiry into Goodwin’s charges that Friend was inefficient, made private use of government boats and crews, and showed ignorance and laxity of conduct.’ He returned to England in 1852 where he d. 21 Oct 1871 at Clevedon, Somerset. ADB, 1788-1850, vol. 1, pp. 417-8.
5 The Cornwall Chronicle, Sat 14 Apr 1838, pp. 1, 58. Emphasis added.
6 The Cornwall Chronicle, Sat 19 May 1838, p. 82.
7 Colonial Times, Tue 29 May1838, p. 5.
8 The Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser, Sat 16 Jun 1838, p. 3.